In 2007, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a call for the design of a new cryptographic hash algorithm in response to vulnerabilities like differential attacks identified in existing hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-1. NIST received many submissions, 51 of which got accepted to the first round. 14 candidates were left in the second round, out of which five candidates have been recently chosen for the final round. An important criterion in the selection process is the SHA-3 hash function security. We identify two important classes of security arguments for the new designs: (1) the possible reductions of the hash function security to the security of its underlying building blocks and (2) arguments against differential attack on building blocks. In this paper, we compare the state of the art provable security reductions for the second round candidates and review arguments and bounds against classes of differential attacks. We discuss all the SHA-3 candidates at a high functional level, analyze, and summarize the security reduction results and bounds against differential attacks. Additionally, we generalize the well-known proof of collision resistance preservation, such that all SHA-3 candidates with a suffix-free padding are covered.
Introduction
Hash functions serve a crucial foundation of numerous cryptographic applications, ranging from key derivation functions over various security protocols to digital signatures. In 2004, a series of differential attacks by Wang et al. [2, 3] have exposed security vulnerabilities in the design of the most widely adopted and deployed SHA-1 hash function. As a result, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) recommended the replacement of SHA-1 by the SHA-2 hash function family and announced a call for the design of a new SHA-3 hashing algorithm. The SHA-3 hash function must allow for message digests of length 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits, it should be efficient, and most importantly it should provide an adequate level of security. In the second round, 14 candidates' hash functions were considered, five candidates remaining in the race for the selection of the SHA-3 hash function in the current third round.
As a result of the performed comparative analysis, several classifications of the SHA-3 candidates, mostly focused on hardware performance, appeared in the literature [4] [5] [6] [7] . A classification based on the NIST-specified security criteria is, however, still due.
NIST security requirements. NIST specifies a number of security requirements [8] to be satisfied by the future SHA-3 function: (i) at least one variant of the hash function must securely support HMAC and randomized hashing. Furthermore, for all n-bit digest values, the hash function must provide (ii) preimage resistance of approximately n bits, (iii) second preimage resistance of approximately n − L bits, where the first preimage is of length at most 2 L blocks, (iv) collision resistance of approximately n/2 bits, and (v) all variants must be resistant to the length-extension attack. Finally, (vi) for any m ≤ n, the hash function specified by taking a fixed subset of m bits of the function's output is required to satisfy properties (ii)-(v) with n replaced by m.
Our Contribution. In this work, we provide a survey of the 14 second round SHA-3 candidates including the five finalists, in which we compare their security reductions, and their resistance against differential attacks. Regarding security reductions, we consider preimage, second preimage and collision resistance (security requirements (ii)-(iv)) for the n = 256 and n = 512 variants. Most of this security analysis is realized in the ideal model, where one or more of the underlying integral building blocks (e.g., the underlying blockcipher or permutation(s)) are assumed to be ideal, i.e., random primitives. To argue collision resistance, we extend the standard proof of Merkle-Damgård collision resistance [9, 10] to cover all second round SHA-3 candidate hash function with a suffix-free padding (Appendix B). Notice that the basic Merkle-Damgård proof does not suffice in the presence of a final transformation and/or a chopping. Additionally, we consider the indifferentiability of the candidates. Informally, indifferentiability guarantees that a design has no structural design flaws [11] , and in particular (as formally proven in Appendix A), an indifferentiability result renders upper bounds on the advantage of finding preimages, second preimages and collisions. The provable security analysis in this contribution extends to the findings of Andreeva et al. [1] .
Recent substantial progress in the differential attacks against SHA-1 [2] is the main motivation for the SHA-3 competition [12] , and many of the first round candidates fell victim to differential attacks as well, due to their wellelaborated and advanced toolbox. Hence, we survey known bounds against classes of these attacks. Note that, to the best of current knowledge, informative bounds exist only for a subset of relevant differential properties. Also, only a subset of all second round SHA-3 candidates allow for such bounds by design, which excludes, e.g., all ARX-based constructions from the analysis. Therefore, in this work, we will be mainly considering upper bounds on the expected differential trail probability (EDTP) of hash function building blocks such as underlying permutations and blockciphers, which are based on substitution-permutation networks. Although EDTP proved to be highly informative in predicting the power of differential cryptanalysis for keyed blockciphers, for most attacks on hash functions, all inputs to the function's building blocks are known and can often even be chosen by the adversary. However, at some point in most major attack techniques against hash functions, the adversary cannot control the difference propagation any more and relies on the differential trails, EDTP becoming again a good predictor of the attack complexity. Thus, due to the lack of a better universal evaluation tool with respect to differential attacks on the one hand, and because of the ability of the differential trails to reflect at least some important features of such attacks on the other, we have opted to use upper bounds on EDTP in our comparative analysis. Section 2 briefly covers the notation, and the basic principles of hash function design. In Sect. 3, we consider all candidates, both from a provable security point of view and from a cryptanalysis view. We give a high-level algorithmic description of each hash function and discuss the existing security results. All results are summarized in Tables 1 and  2 . We conclude the paper with Sect. 4 and give some final remarks on the security comparison.
Preliminaries
For a positive integer value n ∈ N, we denote by Z n 2 the set of bit strings of length n, and by (Z n 2 ) * the set of strings of length a positive multiple of n bits. We denote by Z * 2 the set of bit strings of arbitrary length. If x, y are two bit strings, their concatenation is denoted by x y. By |x| we denote the length of a bit string x, and for m, n ∈ N, we denote by m n the encoding of m as an n-bit string. The function chop n (x) chops off the n rightmost bits of a bit string x.
Throughout, we use a unified notation for all candidates. The value n denotes the output size of the hash function, l the size of the chaining value, and m the number of message bits compressed in one iteration of the compression function. A padded message is always parsed as a sequence of k ≥ 1 message blocks of length m bits: (M 1 , . . . , M k ).
Reductionist security notions
In this section, we investigate the reductionist security of hash functions in the 'ideal model' and the more classical 'generic' security.
Security in the ideal model. In the ideal model, a compressing function F (either on fixed or arbitrary input lengths) that uses one or more underlying building blocks is viewed insecure if there exists a successful information-theoretic adversary that has only query access to the idealized underlying primitives of F. The complexity of the attack is measured by the number of queries q to the primitive made by the adversary. In this work, it is clear from the context which of the underlying primitives is assumed to be ideal. The three main security properties required from the SHA-3 hash function are preimage, second preimage and collision resistance. For each of these three notions, with Adv atk F , where atk ∈ {pre, sec, col}, we denote the maximum advantage of an adversary to break the function F under the security notion atk. The advantage is the probability function taken over all random choices of the underlying primitives, and the maximum is taken over all adversaries that make at mostueries to their oracles.
Additionally, we consider the indifferentiability of the SHA-3 candidates. The indifferentiability framework introduced by Maurer et al. [13] is an extension of the classical notion of indistinguishability and ensures that a hash function has no structural defects. We denote the indifferentiability security of a hash function H by Adv pro H , maximized over all distinguishers making at mostueries of maximal length K ≥ 0 message blocks to their oracles. We refer to [11] for a formal definition. An indifferentiability bound guarantees security of the hash function against specific attacks. In particular, one can obtain a bound on Adv [14] [15] [16] for a more formal discussion.
To argue generic collision resistance security of the hash function H (as domain extenders of fixed input length compression functions), we use the composition result of Merkle and Damgård [9, 10] and extend it to a wider class of suffix-free hash functions (Appendix B). This result concludes the collision resistance of the hash function H assuming collision resistance security guarantees from the underlying compression functions. We then translate ideal model collision resistance security results on the compression functions via the latter composition to ideal model collision results on the hash function (expressed by Adv col H ). A generic collision result, generally speaking, applies to a wider class of schemes for which no bounds on the collision resistance security of the underlying compression functions are known, e.g., for BLAKE and BMW.
If a compressing function F outputs a bit string of length n, one expects to find collisions with high probability after approximately 2 n/2 queries (due to the birthday attack). Similarly, (second) preimages can be found with high probability after approximately 2 n queries 1 . Moreover, finding second preimages is provably harder than finding collisions, and similar for preimages (depending on the specification of F) [16] . Formally, we have (q 2 /2 n ) = Adv col F = O(1), 1 Kelsey and Schneier [17] describe a second preimage attack on the Merkle-Damgård hash function that requires at most approximately 2 n−L queries, where the first preimage is of length at most 2 L blocks. This attack does, however, not apply to all SHA-3 candidates. In particular, the wide-pipe SHA-3 candidates remain mostly unaffected due to their increased internal state.
where ε is negligible if F is a variable input length compressing function. In the remainder, we will consider these bounds for granted, and only include security results that improve either of these bounds. A bound is called tight if the lower and upper bound are the same up to a constant factor, and optimal if the bound is tight with respect to the original lower bound.
Compression function design strategies
A common way to build compression functions is to base it on a blockcipher [18] [19] [20] , or on a (limited number of) permutation(s) [21] [22] [23] . Preneel et al. [19] analyzed and categorized 64 blockcipher-based compression functions. Twelve of them were formally proven secure by Black et al. [18] . These results have been recently generalized by Stam [20] . Interestingly, the latter result implies security bounds for some compression functions that do not fit in the PGV model, like ECHO, Hamsi and SIMD. In the ideal model, everywhere second preimage resistance of the compression function can be proven similar as the preimage resistance, up to a constant (the security analysis differs only in that we give the adversary one query for free). Throughout, by 'PGVx', we denote the xth type compression function of [19] . We note that PGV1, PGV3, and PGV5 are better known as the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas, the Miyaguchi-Preneel, and the DaviesMeyer compression functions, respectively.
In the context of permutation-based compression functions, Black et al. [21] analyzed 2l-to l-bit compression functions based on one l-bit permutation and proved them insecure. This result has been generalized by Rogaway and Steinberger [22] , Stam [23] , and Steinberger [24] to compression functions with arbitrary input and output sizes, and an arbitrary number of underlying permutations. Their bounds indicate the number of queries required to find collisions or preimages for permutation-based compression functions.
Hash function design strategies
In order to allow the hashing of arbitrarily long strings, all SHA-3 candidates employ a specific mode of operation. Central to all designs is the iterated hash function principle [25] : on input of an initialization vector IV, the iterated hash function H f based on the compression function f proceeds a padded message (M 1 , . . . , M k ) as follows:
h 0 = IV,
This principle is also called the plain Merkle-Damgård (MD) design [9, 10] . Each of the 14 remaining candidates is based on this design, possibly followed by a final transformation (FT), and/or a chop function. 2 The padding function pad : Z * 2 → Z m 2 * is an injective mapping that transforms a message of arbitrary length to a message of length a multiple of m bits (the number of message bits compressed in one compression function iteration). Most of the candidates employ a sufficiently strong padding rule (cf. Fig. 2 ). Additionally, in some of the designs, the message blocks are compressed along with specific counters or tweaks, which may strengthen the padding rule. We distinguish between 'prefix-free' and/or 'suffix-free' padding. A padding rule is called suffix-free, if for any distinct M, M , there exists no bit string X such that pad(M ) = X pad(M). The plain MD design with any suffix-free padding (also called MD-strengthening [25] ) preserves collision resistance [9, 10] . We generalize this result in Theorem 2 (Appendix B): informally, this preservation result also holds if the iteration is finalized by a distinct compression function and/or the chop-function. Other security properties, like preimage resistance, are, however, not preserved in the MD design [14] . It is also proven that the MD design with a suffix-free padding need not necessarily be indifferentiable [11] . However, the MD construction is indifferentiable if it ends with a chopping function or a final transformation, both when the underlying compression function is ideal or when the hash function is based on a PGV compression function [11, 26, 27] .
A padding rule is called prefix-free, if for any distinct M, M , there exists no bit string X such that pad(M ) = pad(M) X . It has been proved that the MD design, based on ideal compression function or ideal PGV construction, with prefix-free padding is indifferentiable from a random oracle [11, [26] [27] [28] . Security notions, like collision resistance, are, however, not preserved in the MD design with prefix-free only padding.
HAIFA design. A concrete design based on the MD principle is the HAIFA construction [29] . In HAIFA, the message is padded in a specific way so as to solve some deficiencies of the original MD construction: in the iteration, each message block is accompanied with a fixed (optional) salt of s bits and a (mandatory) counter C i of t bits. The counter C i keeps track of the number of message bits hashed so far and equals 0 by definition if the ith block does not contain any message bits. Partially, due to the properties of this counter, the HAIFA padding rule is suffix-and prefix-free. As a consequence, the construction preserves collision resistance (cf. Theorem 2) and the indifferentiability results of [11] carry over. For the HAIFA design, these indifferentiability results are improved in [30] . Furthermore, the HAIFA construction 2 A function g is a final transformation if it differs from f and is applied to the final state, possibly with the injection of an additional message block. The chop function is not considered to be (a part of) a final transformation.
is proven secure against second preimage attacks if the underlying compression function is assumed to behave like an ideal primitive [31] .
Wide-pipe design. In the wide-pipe design [32] , the iterated state size is significantly larger than the final hash output: at the end of the iteration, a fraction of the output of a construction is discarded. As proved in [11] , the MD construction with a distinct final transformation and/or chopping at the end is indifferentiable from a random oracle.
Sponge functions. We do not explicitly consider sponge functions [33] or their generalization [34] as a specific type of construction: all SHA-3 candidates known to be sponge(-like) functions, CubeHash, Fugue, JH, Keccak and Luffa, can be described in terms of the chop-MD construction (possibly with a final transformation before or instead of the chopping).
Concrete security of hash functions and differential cryptanalysis
All security notions and design approaches mentioned so far substantially assume the underlying primitives of hash functions (such as compression functions, permutations, or blockciphers) to behave in an idealized way, where the primitive is randomly drawn from the corresponding class of primitives. However, any practical setting requires the primitives to be efficiently implementable, their representation being compact. As a matter of fact, this does not comply with the random procedure of choice assumed, since it is extremely improbable to select a compactly implementable primitive at random. Thus, once the rule of domain extension has been proven sound assuming the idealness of the underlying primitive, the problem of evaluating the concrete primitive with respect to real-world attacks arises. In this paper, we choose to employ the toolbox of differential cryptanalysis [35] to address the latter problem, particularly because this analysis approach is also responsible for the attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, which are the main motivation for the SHA-3 competition.
The security of hash functions with respect to such central requirements as (second) preimage and collision resistance can be reformulated in terms of the input and output differences of the underlying primitives. A large proportion, though not all, of second round SHA-3 candidates follow design approaches allowing one to efficiently argue the resistance of their primitives (compression functions, permutations, ciphers) to differential cryptanalysis. These are mainly those candidates relying on the substitution-diffusion networks (often similar to AES [36] or even reusing its components), which make proofs of some relevant properties in the domain of differential cryptanalysis possible [37] .
Differentials, DP, EDP. Strictly speaking, for some primitive φ mapping to n bits, we do not want the differential probability (DP) of any non-trivial differential (Δ, ∇) over φ to significantly deviate from 2 −n (see [38] for a comprehensive statistical study of this parameter for idealized permutations and functions). The differential (Δ, ∇) for primitive φ consists of input difference Δ and output difference ∇. Once the parameters of φ are fixed (keys, salts, initial vectors, etc.), one speaks about the differential probability DP as the probability for (Δ, ∇) to hold averaged over all inputs. The expected DP (EDP) is the DP averaged over all sets of parameters for φ.
Differential trails, DTP, EDTP. For most practical constructions, however, it is often impossible to derive any tight (and, thus, informative) upper bounds on DP or even EDP. That is why, to simplify the analysis, one frequently has to revert to differential trails and their probabilities for the evaluation of designs with respect to differential cryptanalysis [35, 37] . A differential can be seen as the set of all difference propagation paths from Δ to ∇ through intermediate differences corresponding to the iterations of an iterative construction. Each of these paths is called a differential trail. The probability that a differential trail holds is referred to as differential trail probability (DTP). Similar to differentials, the expected DTP averaged over all parameters will be denoted as EDTP.
For substitution-diffusion networks, a common belief is that keeping the number of active S-boxes (those involved into the difference propagation) high is correlated with lower values of EDTPs and EDPs, which gave rise to the wide trail design strategy [39] and resulted in the successful design of AES [37] . However, formally speaking, the number of active S-boxes and their local DPs do not directly translate to EDP over several rounds of primitives, being only adequate for deriving bounds on single-round EDP. Attempts have been made to compute informative upper bounds on EDP over several rounds of AES: though it has been possible to compute the exact maximum EDP for two rounds of AES [40] , the problem persists for four rounds [41] . However, one can still prove some upper bounds on EDP over more than two rounds, which has been done, e.g., to evaluate the security of SHAvite-3 and ECHO by their respective designers. As applied to SHA-3 candidates, we will talk about EDTP whenever the results deal with more rounds than one could cover by a tight upper bound on EDP.
Depending on a concrete hash function among the second round SHA-3 candidates, the respective designers deal with distinct definitions of a differential trail to derive a bound on EDTP for the building blocks. Such definitions range from the S-box level (e.g., Fugue, Grøstl, and JH) to several AES rounds (e.g., ECHO and SHAvite-3). As a rule, going from the S-box level to the level of several rounds results in bounds on EDTP closer to EDP.
Throughout the paper, we refer to the upper bounds on EDP and EDTP (attained or not attained) as MEDP and MEDTP, respectively.
SHA-hash function candidates
In this section, we analyze the security of the 14 remaining SHA-3 candidates in more detail, from a provable security perspective as well as with respect to the security against classes of differential attacks. Each paragraph contains an informal discussion for each candidate, its reductionist security results, and its security against differential attacks. The mathematical descriptions of the (abstracted) designs are given in Fig. 1 , and the candidates' padding functions are summarized in Fig. 2 .
With respect to the reductionist security, for simplicity, we only consider the proposals of the SHA-3 candidates that output digests of 256 or 512 bits. Observe that in many candidate SHA-3 hash function families, the algorithms outputting 224 or 384 bits are the same as the 256-or 512-bits algorithms, except for an additional chopping at the end. Particularly, the results of [11] and Theorem 2 carry over in most of the cases. The same remark applies to requirement (vi) of NIST.
Requirement (i). All designers claim that their proposal can safely be used in HMAC mode [42] or for randomized hashing [43] , and we do not discuss it here; Requirements (ii)-(iv). Preimage, second preimage and collision resistance of each hash function are discussed in this section. Additionally, we also consider the indifferentiability of the candidates; Requirement (v). All hash function candidates are secure against the length-extension attack, and thus we do not discuss it further.
The reductionist security results for all current candidate hash functions are summarized in Table 1 .
With respect to the security against classes of differential attacks, the primitives of all candidate hash functions are analyzed. These security results are summarized in Table 2 .
3.1.
The BLAKE hash function [44] is a HAIFA construction. The message blocks are accompanied with a HAIFA-counter, and more generally, the function employs a suffix-and prefix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based. 3 It moreover employs an injective linear function L, and a linear function L that XORs the first and second halves of the input.
Reductionist security of BLAKE. The compression function of BLAKE is proven optimally collision, second preimage and preimage resistant [45] . As the mode of operation of BLAKE is based on the HAIFA structure, all security properties regarding this type (cf. Sect. 2.3) hold [29] provided the compression function is assumed to be ideal. However, as independently shown by Andreeva et al. [45] and Chang et al. [46] , the BLAKE compression function shows non-random behavior: it is differentiable from a random compression function in about 2 n/4 queries, making the above-mentioned security properties invalid. Still, Theorem 2 applies to BLAKE, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for BLAKE implies a preimage for its final transformation, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). The hash function is moreover proven optimally second preimage resistant in the ideal cipher model by Andreeva et al. [45] , which gives Adv sec H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, the BLAKE hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying blockcipher is ideal [45, 46] .
Bounds on DTP for BLAKE. No informative bounds on DTP are known for BLAKE.
3.2.
The Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) hash function [47] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based 4 , and the final transformation g consists of the same compression function with the chaining value processed as a message, and with an initial value as chaining input. The compression function employs a function L, which consists of two compression functions with specific properties as specified in [47] .
Reductionist security of BMW. The compression function of BMW shows similarities with the PGV3 compres-sion function [18] , but no security results are known for this variant. Theorem 2 applies to BMW, where the final transformation has no message block as input, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv
Additionally, a preimage for BMW implies a preimage for its final transformation, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, albeit no indifferentiability proof for the BMW hash function is known, we note that BMW can be seen as a combination of the HMAC-and the chop-construction, both proven indifferentiable from a random oracle [11] . We remark that a distinguisher for the compression function of BMW is derived in [48] .
Bounds on DTP for BMW. No informative bounds on DTP are known for BMW.
3.3.
The CubeHash hash function [49] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The compression function f is permutation-based, and the final transformation g consists of flipping a certain bit in the state and applying 10 more compression function rounds on zeromessages.
Reductionist security of CubeHash. The compression function of CubeHash is based on one permutation 5 , and collisions and preimages for the compression function can be found in one query to the permutation [21] . The CubeHash hash function is as parazoa design proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutation is assumed to be ideal [34] . Using Theorem 1, this indifferentiability bound additionally renders an optimal collision resistance bound for CubeHash, Adv 2 l−n on the preimage and second preimage resistance. Note that these bounds are optimal for the n = 256 variant.
Bounds on DTP for CubeHash. No informative bounds on DTP are known for CubeHash.
3.4.
The ECHO hash function [50] is a chop-HAIFA construction. The message blocks are accompanied with a HAIFA-counter, and more generally, the function employs a suffix-and prefix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based. 6 It moreover employs a linear function L that chops the state in blocks of length l bits, and XORs these.
Reductionist security of ECHO. The compression function of ECHO is a 'chopped single call Type-I' compression function in the categorization of [20] . Therefore, the results of [20, Theorem 15] carry over, yielding optimal security bounds for the compression function. Observe that these results can easily be adjusted to obtain bound Adv
ECHO is a combination of HAIFA and chop-MD, but it is unclear whether all HAIFA security properties hold after chopping. Still, Theorem 2 applies to ECHO, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for ECHO implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, the ECHO hash function would be indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying compression function is assumed to be ideal, due to the chopping function at the end [11] . However, the compression function of ECHO is easily differentiable from a random oracle [51] , and we cannot directly apply the results of [11] .
Bounds on DTP for ECHO. The primitive for all versions of ECHO is ECHO.AES with a 2048-bit block size, having 8 and 10 rounds for hash sizes up to 256 and 512 bit, respectively. One underlying function of ECHO.AES is given by the application of two AES rounds. The exact value of the MEDP for two rounds of AES is about 2 −28.27 . One round of ECHO.AES provides one active function. Two rounds provide an upper bound on MEDP of about 2 −4·28.27 , an equivalent of four active functions. Similarly, the bound on the MEDP over four rounds yields an equivalent of 16 active functions. MEDP for ECHO is considered averaged over salt and counter. Combining the above results, one obtains upper bounds on the differential trail probability over up to 10 rounds, outlined in Table 2 . Note that a differential trail in this case is defined as a concatenation of either 1, 2, or 4 rounds of ECHO.AES. Correspondingly, the MEDTP is computed under the consideration of the above MEDP values for 1, 2, or 4 rounds of ECHO.AES. [52] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is permutation-based, and the final transformation consists of a permutationP, which differs from P in the parametrization. The compression function employs a linear function L for message injection (TIX of [52] ).
The Fugue hash function
Reductionist security of Fugue. The compression function of Fugue is based on one permutation, and collisions and preimages for the compression function can be found in one query to the permutation [21] . As a consequence, the result of Theorem 2 is irrelevant, even though the padding rule of Fugue is suffix-free. The Fugue hash function is as parazoa design proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutations P andP are assumed to be ideal [34] . Using Theorem 1, this indifferentiability bound additionally renders an optimal collision resistance bound for Fugue, Adv 2 l−m−n on the preimage and second preimage resistance. Note that these bounds are optimal for the n = 256 variant. We remark that a distinguisher for the final round of Fugue is derived in [53, 54] .
Bounds on DTP for Fugue. For Fugue, a number of arguments against differential attacks exist that are compared to all other bounds for candidates discussed in this paper, rather different in nature. The main statement for Fugue is a theorem that assumes that the adversary is given a random pair of states satisfying any difference of his choice. It then investigates whether the adversary would be able to find a pair of message inputs that converts these states into a full internal collision after exactly four round transformations. The theorem proves, under some independence assumption, that the probability that such message inputs exist is bounded by 2 −168 . For a lower number of rounds, the probability will be higher, though it is not clear how the probability of a higher number of rounds will be.
The Grøstl hash function [55] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is permutation-based, and the final transformation g is defined as g(h) = P(h) ⊕ h.
Reductionist security of Grøstl. The compression function of Grøstl is permutation-based, and the results of [22, 23] apply. Furthermore, the preimage resistance of the compression function is analyzed in [56] , and an upper bound for collision resistance can be obtained easily. As a consequence, we obtain tight security bounds on the compression function, Adv pre f = Θ(q 2 /2 l ) and Adv col f = Θ(q 4 /2 l ). In the ideal model, everywhere second preimage resistance of the compression function can be proven similar as the preimage resistance, up to a constant (the security analysis differs only in that we give the adversary one query for free).
Theorem 2 applies to Grøstl, where the final transformation has no message block as input. Observe that we also have Adv col chop •g = Θ(q 2 /2 n ), and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for Grøstl implies a preimage for its final transformation, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). The hash function is moreover proven optimally second preimage resistant in the ideal permutations model [57] , which gives Adv sec H = Θ(q/2 n−L ), where the first preimage is of length at most 2 L blocks. Furthermore, the Grøstl hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutations are ideal [58] .
Bounds on DTP for Grøstl. The compression function of Grøstl is based on two permutations of size 512 for Grøstl-224 and Grøstl-256 and is based on two permutations of size 1024 for Grøstl-384 and Grøstl-512. Those permutations are designed according to the wide trail design strategy [39] , hence known bounds on the MEDTP carry over as follows. For two rounds, at least 9 S-boxes, for four rounds, at least 81 S-boxes are active. A lower bound on the DP of the employed AES S-box is 2 −6 . From this, the 4-round MEDTP is 2 −486 . For the 10-round 512-bit permutation the MEDTP is hence 2 −1026 , and for the 14-round 1024-bit permutation the MED-TP is hence 2 −1512 .
3.7.
The Hamsi hash function [59] is a MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is permutation-based, but the last round is executed with a compression function g based on a permutatioñ P, which differs from P in the parametrization. The compression functions employ a linear code Exp for message injection [59] .
Reductionist security of Hamsi. The compression function of Hamsi is a 'chopped single call Type-I' compression function in the categorization of [20] . Therefore, the results of [20, Theorem 15] carry over, yielding optimal security bounds for the compression function. Observe that these bounds also apply to the function g. Theorem 2 applies to Hamsi, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for Hamsi implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtainAdv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, the Hamsi hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutations are ideal [60] .
Bounds on DTP for Hamsi. No informative bounds on DTP are known for Hamsi.
The JH hash function [61] is a chop-MD construction.
The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is permutation-based.
Reductionist security of JH. The compression function of JH is based on one permutation, and collisions and preimages for the compression function can be found in one query to the permutation [21] . As a consequence, the result of Theorem 2 is irrelevant, even though the padding rule of JH is suffix-free. The JH hash function is proven optimally collision resistant [62] and proven preimage and second preimage resistant up to bound O q 2 n + q 2 2 l−m [57] . Furthermore, the JH hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutation is ideal [63] .
Bounds on DTP for JH.The JH permutation consists of 42 rounds of a generalized AES-like structure. Note the number of rounds has been increased in the 3rd round submission documents for JH. The maximum DP of the 4-bit S-box used is 2 −2 . The specification document suggests that 17 rounds of the underlying permutation yield at least 296 active S-boxes. Since no formal treatment of the differential effect has been conducted, we consider the differential trails on the S-box level in this work. So the MEDTP for the 2 · 17 = 34 rounds is at most 2 −1184 , which is also the MEDTP value we take for all 42 rounds, as no lower bounds are provided on the number of active S-boxes for less than 17 rounds.
3.9.
The Keccak hash function [64] is a chop-MD construction. The compression function f is permutation-based. The hash function output is obtained by chopping off l − n bits of the state. Notice that the parameters of Keccak satisfy l = 2n + m.
Reductionist security of Keccak. The compression function of Keccak is based on one permutation, and collisions and preimages for the compression function can be found in one query to the permutation [21] . The Keccak hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying permutation is assumed to be ideal [65] . Using Theorem 1, this indifferentiability bound additionally renders an optimal collision resistance bound for Keccak, Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ), as well as an optimal preimage second preimage resistance bound Θ(q/2 n ).
Bounds on DTP for Keccak. No informative bounds on DTP are known for Keccak.
3.10.
The Luffa hash function [66] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The compression function f is permutation-based, and the final transformation g is built on this compression function and a linear function L that chops the state in blocks of length m bits, and XORs these. The compression function employs a linear function L for message injection (MI of [66] ) 7 . Notice that the state size of Luffa satisfies l = w · m.
Reductionist security of Luffa. The compression function of Luffa is based on w permutations executed independently. As a consequence, collisions and preimages for the compression function can be found in at most 5 queries to the 7 We defined the output transformation in a slightly more complicated but unified way. Essentially, Luffa 256 simply outputs L (h). Observe that we implicitly captured the extra compression function call in the adjusted padding.
permutations [21] . The Luffa hash function borrows characteristics from the sponge design and is similar to the parazoa design, if the permutation P consisting of the w permutations P i is considered ideal, and ideas from the indifferentiability proofs of [34, 65] may carry over. However, for the case of w different permutations P i , this is not immediately clear. We remark that a distinguisher for the permutation of Luffa is derived in [67] .
Bounds on DTP for Luffa. The Luffa permutations consist of eight rounds. Using an exhaustive search, designers report a minimal number of active S-boxes for four rounds of 31. A lower bound on the DP of the employed AES S-box is 2 −2 ; hence, the MEDTP for the full 8-round permutation is 2 −124 .
3.11.
The Shabal hash function [68] is a chop-MD construction. The message blocks are accompanied with a counter, and the last block is iterated three times. In particular, the function employs a suffix-and prefix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based. Notice that the parameters of Shabal satisfy l = 384 + 2m.
Reductionist security of Shabal. A bound on the collision resistance of the compression function of Shabal is derived in [68] . Concretely, it is proven that the Shabal compression function is collision-resistant up to q = 2 (l−m)/2 queries. Theorem 2 applies to Shabal. Collision and preimage resistance of Shabal are studied in [68] , yielding optimal bounds Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ) and Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Furthermore, the same authors prove the Shabal hash function to be indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying blockcipher is assumed to be ideal [68] . Using Theorem 1, this indifferentiability bound additionally renders an improved upper bound O q 2 n + q 2 2 l−m on the second preimage resistance. Note that this bound is optimal for the n = 256 variant. We remark that a distinguisher for the blockcipher of Shabal is derived in [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] .
Bounds on DTP for Shabal. No informative bounds on DTP are known for Shabal.
3.12.
The SHAvite-3 hash function [74] is a HAIFA construction. The message blocks are accompanied with a HAIFA-counter, and more generally, the function employs a suffix-and prefix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based.
Reductionist security of SHAvite-3. The compression function of SHAvite-3 is the PGV5 compression function, and the security results of [18] carry over. As a consequence, we obtain optimal security bounds on the compression function. The mode of operation of SHAvite-3 is based on the HAIFA structure, and as a consequence, all security properties regarding this type hold [29] . In particular, the design preserves collision resistance, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Also, the design is secure against second preimage attacks. Additionally, a preimage for SHAvite-3 implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). Finally, the SHAvite-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying blockcipher is assumed to be ideal, due to the prefix-free padding [11] . This result has been improved under the assumption that the underlying compression function is ideal [30] . However, the compression function of SHAvite-3 is easily differentiable from a random oracle due to the presence of fixed-points.
Bounds on DTP for SHAvite-3. The underlying cipher for SHAvite-3 224 and SHAvite-3 256 is E 256 , which operates on two block halves of 128 bit each using the balanced Feistel construction. Every two or three rounds of balanced Feistel add at least one or two active functions, respectively. The differential probability of one function (three AES rounds) in E 256 is shown to be upper bounded by 2 −49 [74] . This leads to at least 8 functions active within 12 rounds and a differential trail probability of at most 2 −392 after 12 rounds of E 256 . While the lower bounds of [74] on the number of differentially active functions appear to be tight for E 256 , this is not the case for E 512 , the blockcipher underlying SHAvite-3 384 and SHAvite-3 512 , which is based on a 4-line type-II generalized Feistel network structure. One can prove that 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 rounds of E 512 yield at least 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 differentially active functions, respectively. This result combined with the proven upper bound of 2 −113 on the differential probability of one function (four AES rounds) [74] gives the upper bound of 2 −1356 on the differential trail probability over 14 rounds of E 512 . Note that we consider differential trails on the round level of SHAvite-3 here.
3.13.
The SIMD hash function [75] is a chop-MD construction, with a final transformation before chopping. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding rule. The compression function f is blockcipher-based, but the last round is executed with a compression function g based on a blockcipher E, which differs from E in the parametrization. These functions employ a quasi-group operation 8 L [75] .
Reductionist security of SIMD. The compression function of SIMD is a 'rate-1 Type-I' compression function in the categorization of [20] . Therefore, the results of [20, Theorem 6] carry over, yielding optimal security bounds for the compression function. Observe that these bounds also apply to the function g. Observe moreover that these results can easily be adjusted to obtain bound Adv
Theorem 2 applies to SIMD, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for SIMD implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, the SIMD hash function would be indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying compression functions are assumed to be ideal, due to the chopping function at the end [11] . However, the compression functions of SIMD are easily differentiable from a random oracle [76] , and we cannot directly apply the results of [11] .
Bounds on DTP for SIMD. A number of arguments against differential attacks are made [76] that do not directly fit into the framework considered in this paper as they are based on some (mild) conditions rather than applying unconditionally. One assumption is that the attacker has to use differences on the message input, which rules out certain attacks on building blocks like the blockcipher or compression function. Using a minimum distance of 520 for SIMD-256 and 1032 for SIMD-512, and a number of assumptions some of which are in favor of an attacker and some of the design, authors give a lower bound of at least 132 conditions for any differential trail in SIMD-256, and a lower bound of at least 253 conditions for any differential trail in SIMD-512.
3.14.
The Skein hash function [77] is a chop-MD construction. The message blocks are accompanied with a roundspecific tweak, 9 and more generally, the function employs a suffix-and prefix-free padding rule. The compression function f is based on a tweakable blockcipher.
Reductionist security of Skein. The compression function of Skein is the PGV1 compression function, with a difference that a tweak is involved. As claimed in [78] , the results of [18] carry over, which in turn results in optimal security bounds on the compression function. Theorem 2 applies to Skein, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for Skein implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtain Adv pre H = Θ(q/2 n ). The hash function is moreover proven optimally second preimage resistant in the ideal cipher model [57] , which gives Adv sec H = Θ(q/2 n ). Furthermore, the Skein hash function is proven indifferentiable from a random oracle if the underlying tweakable blockcipher is assumed to be ideal [78] . This proof is based on the preimage-awareness approach [79] .
Bounds on DTP for Skein. No informative bounds on DTP are known for Skein.
3.15.
The SHA-2 hash function [80] is an MD construction. The hash function employs a suffix-free padding. The compression function f is blockcipher-based.
Reductionist security of SHA-2. The compression function of SHA-2 is the PGV5 compression function (with minor modification), and the security results of [18] carry over. As a consequence, we obtain optimal security bounds on the compression function. Theorem 2 applies to SHA-2, and as a consequence, we obtain Adv col H = Θ(q 2 /2 n ). Additionally, a preimage for SHA-2 implies a preimage for its last compression function, and we obtain Adv pre
The hash function is moreover proven optimally second preimage resistant in the ideal function model [31] , which gives Adv sec H = Θ(q/2 n−L ), where the first preimage is of length at most 2 L blocks. Furthermore, the SHA-2 hash function is differentiable from a random oracle due to an attack described in [11] .
Bounds on DTP for SHA-2. No informative bounds on DTP are known for SHA-2.
Summary and conclusions
In this survey, we compared the security achieved by the round 2 SHA-3 hash function candidates. The main contribution of this paper is the summary of the security reductions for the hash function candidates in Table 1 , and a comparison of the resistance of the designs against classes of differential attacks in Table 2 . Before giving an interpretation of these results, we first make some remarks on the provided classification.
-Assuming ideality of the underlying primitives (permutations or blockciphers) is not realistic. In particular, none of the candidates' primitives is ideal, and some even have identified weaknesses. However, assuming ideality of these primitives gives significantly more confidence in the security of the higher level structure and is the only way to get useful (and comparable) security bounds on the candidate hash functions; -The fact that different hash functions have different bounds, does not directly imply that one of the functions offers a higher level of security: albeit the underlying structure of the basic primitives is abstracted away (see the previous item), still many differences among the schemes remain (chaining size, message input size, etc.). Moreover, not all bounds are tight, and different definitions of differential trails are employed.
In general, stronger assumptions as a rule imply stronger claims; however, results making less assumptions often offer higher correlation with the real-world security.
Reductionist security
Security of the compression function. For the sponge (-like) hash functions, CubeHash, Fugue, JH, Keccak and Luffa, collisions and preimages for the compression function Table 1 A schematic summary of reductionist results on second round SHA-3 candidates and SHA-2. The first column describes the hash function construction, and the second and third column show which hash functions have a suffix-free (sf) or prefix-free (pf) padding. The fourth column summarizes the main parameters n, l, m, which denote the hash function output size, the chaining value size and the message input size, respectively. In the remaining columns, the security bounds are summarized together with the underlying assumptions. All other notions and notations and further explained in Sect. 2 
Note that the presented bounds do not allow for direct comparisons, as proofs of bounds on EDTP for different hash functions work with distinct definitions of a differential trail. See the respective subsections of Sect. 3 for the differential trail definitions for each specific hash function under consideration. Note that the absence of MEDTP-related information (marked with −) does not mean that the respective design is insecure against differential cryptanalysis. Neither does it mean that there are no other attacks on the design can be found in a constant number of queries. This does not have direct implications for the security of the hash function. In fact, the only consequence is that it becomes unreasonable to assume ideality of the compression function in order to prove security at a higher level. Most of the remaining nine candidates are provided with a tight bound for collision and/or preimage resistance of the compression function, merely due to the results of [18, 20, 45] . Single exception is BMW, for which the results of [20] are not directly applicable. With respect to second preimage resistance of the compression functions, we note that in the ideal model (everywhere) second preimage resistance of the compression function can be proven similar as the preimage resistance, up to a constant (the security analysis differs only in that we give the adversary one query for free);
Indifferentiability of the hash function. Ten of the candidates are proven indifferentiable from a random oracle, and four of the candidates have a similar constructions to ones proven indifferentiable. We note that there exist some differences among the bounds. For instance, for the hash function variant outputting n = 512 bits, the indifferentiability bounds vary between O(K q 3 /2 512 ) and O((K q) 2 /2 1024 ). These differences are mainly caused by the fact that the bounds are parameterized by the internal chaining value size l, rather than the output size n (as is the case for bounds on the collision resistance). As a consequence, a higher state size often results in a better indifferentiability bound. The indifferentiability results are powerful, as they render bounds on the (second) preimage and collision resistance of the design (Theorem 1); (Second) preimage resistance of the hash function. Most of the hash functions are not provided with an optimal security bound on the second preimage resistance. Main cause for this is that the MD design does not preserve second preimage resistance [14] . Additionally, the second preimage bound that can be derived via the indifferentiability (Theorem 1) is not always sufficiently tight. Proving security against these attacks could be attempted either by making a different (possibly weaker) assumption on the compression function or by basing it directly on the ideality of the underlying blockcipher or permutation(s). A fruitful direction might be the graph based approach followed in [31, 45, 57, 68] ; Collision resistance of the hash function. Except for the sponge(-like) functions, the collision resistance preservation result of Theorem 2 (Appendix B) applies to all candidates. This theorem results in a bound on the generic collision resistance of the hash function, which, intuitively, means that 'finding collisions for the hash function is at least as hard as finding collisions for (one of) the underlying function(s)'. Together with the collision resistance bounds on the compression functions in the ideal model, the preservation result allows for obtaining a collision resistance bound on the entire hash function. This leads to optimal bounds on the collision resistance for ECHO, Grøstl, Hamsi, SHAvite-3, SIMD and Skein. For BLAKE, CubeHash, Fugue, JH, Keccak and Shabal, the same optimal bound is obtained differently (e.g., based on the indifferentiability of the hash function). Again, the graph based approach may be suitable to prove collision resistance of the candidates for which no collision resistance bound is yet obtained.
Bounds on the differential properties
We presented a first approach to the problem of comparing the differential properties of diverse contemporary hash function designs at the example of the second round SHA-3 candidates. This research problem is not easy, nor is it close to being resolved, which is mainly for the following reasons:
-Many hash function primitives have been designed using non-SPN approaches, mostly relying on ARX operations, for which it does not appear trivial to compute an informative upper bound on any differential properties such as differential trail probability. Therefore, for approximately half of the SHA-3 candidates, we do not know where the bounds are and we have to perform our comparative analysis among the remaining designs only; -The bounds on differential properties are derived for single underlying primitives, while a hash function can invoke multiple primitives in each compression step: it is one invocation for ECHO, Fugue, JH, and SHAvite-3, two invocations for Grøstl, as well as 3 to 5 invocations for Luffa. This fact has to be taken into account before drawing conclusions about the security of a hash function with respect to differential attacks. Note also that different attacks can use different numbers of building blocks and relations among them; -Strictly speaking, given a bound on the expected differential trail probability, it is hard to say what it exactly implies for the expected differential probability, since there might be strong differential effects. Note that such MEDTP bounds as the ones for ECHO and SHAvite-3 already take into account much of the differential effect; -An upper bound on the expected differential trail probability (averaged over some parameters of the primitive) can make only a limited statement about the differential probability taken for the fixed parameters or the maximum differential probability taken over all inputs. At the same time, it is exactly the latter properties, which are related to the real-world attack complexities on hash functions.
Each of the limitations mentioned can be seen as an important research problem, which can be informally summarized as deriving tighter bounds on more informative properties of larger objects. We think that having some formal arguments against at least basic types of attacks contributes to the confidence in the design. A hash function that is provided with a sound security analysis is not necessarily a 'good' function, nor is it a 'bad' function if only little security results are known. The quality of the hash function depends further on other criteria not covered in this classification, such as its software/hardware performance and the strength of a concrete instantiation toward more specific attacks, not necessarily of differential nature. Yet, both security reductions and provable resistance against basic differential cryptanalysis guarantee that the hash function has no severe structural weaknesses, and in particular that the design does not suffer weaknesses that can be trivially exploited by cryptanalysts.
and t = min{t 1 , t 2 } − 2(K − 1)τ f , where τ f is the time to evaluate f and K is the maximum length of the messages, in blocks.
Proof Suppose A is a (t, ε) collision finding attacker for H. We construct collision finding adversaries B 1 and B 2 for f and g, respectively, using the following observation.
Let M, M be two distinct messages such that H(M) = H(M ). Let (M 1 , . . . , M k ) 
, this results in a collision for g . Assume the contrary, and let j ∈ {1, . . . , min{k, k } − 1} be the minimal index such that
We notice that such index j exists: in case k = k , it exists as M = M , and in case k = k , it exists as the padding rule is suffix-free. By definition of the index j, we have h k− j = h k − j , and in particular, we obtain a collision for f :
Both B 1 , B 2 follow this procedure. If M, M define a collision for f , B 1 outputs this collision. Similarly for B 2 and g . Both adversaries work in time at most t + 2(K − 1)τ f , from which we deduce t ≥ min{t 1 , t 2 } − 2(K − 1)τ f . The messages M, M define a collision for f or g . Thus, we obtain ε ≤ ε 1 + ε 2 .
In case the design is based on the compression function f only (but it may still include the chopping), the above result can easily be simplified to Adv gcol H (A) ≤ Adv gcol f (B 1 ), where f = chop l−n • f . Observe that this result also holds if l = n, and in particular, the basic theorems of Merkle and Damgård are covered as well. We note that Theorem 2 can be generalized arbitrarily, e.g., to more different compression functions, but for the purpose of this paper, the mentioned generalization of the Merkle-Damgård structure suffices.
